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This paper studies the link between employee ownership schemes and social capital in 
the corporation. Several authors have argued that a personal initial financial 
investment is required for the full effects of employee ownership to be realised. 
Others claim that all employees of a corporation should be actually involved in 
employee ownership plans for the corporation to reap the full benefits of such plans. 
We use the concept of social capital to assess the respective merits of both options 
and to defend the claim that employee ownership plans that do not require an initial 
investment are the preferred option, at least when those plans are not restricted to 
managerial employees. The first section of this paper contains an introduction. In the 
second section, we analyse several models of the effects of employee ownership 
schemes upon satisfaction and profitability. We argue that the socio-dynamic effects 
of ownership outweigh other effects (e.g. the extrinsic motivation effects). That 
analysis allows us, in the third section, to identify the potential contribution of social 
capital. We suggest that social capital supports the socio-dynamic effects of 
ownership. Hence, we posit that social capital moderates the effects of employee 
ownership upon organisational performance. In the fourth and fifth sections, we 
conduct an explorative empirical test of that proposition through two case-studies in 
partly employee-owned small Belgian software corporations. We find support for the 
moderating role of social capital. However, the findings indicate that the ownership 
scheme itself has a significant impact upon the social capital in the firm. Collective 
ownership schemes (schemes that do not require individual investment) seem to 
increase the level of social capital and thereby have more positive effects on 
organisational performance than other ownership schemes. 
Key words: employee ownership, social capital, participative management 
1 This research report is based on a text presented at the 25th VWEC "Stakeholder synergy" in Hasselt 
on the 14th of March 2002. We gratefully acknowledge the comments of Luk Bouckaert and other 
members of the VWEC commission on Business Ethics and Employee Participation. This paper also 
benefited from the questions raised by the participants in the VWEC. Remaining errors are our sole 
responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
For the last couple of years, financial participation has gained increasing attention 
from political leaders on the Belgian and European levels, because of its expected 
beneficial effects upon productivity, profitability and competitiveness. "Financial 
participation" basically refers to any system whereby the financial gains (or losses2) 
of a company are shared with its workers. Contrary to various bonus schemes, 
fmancial participation (1) has a lasting character; (2) involves at least a majority of 
workers and, in those cases where all workers are not involved, the group who 
benefits from the scheme must be defmed with objective criteria (e.g. years of 
employment); (3) is tied to some measurable corporate performance index; and (4) is 
organised on the plant or corporation level (Uvalic, 1991). 
One may distinguish two broad categories of financial participation: profit-sharing 
and employee ownership. This paper focuses on employee ownership. Employee 
ownership can be defined as any scheme giving the workers access to the capital of 
their corporation. This access can be given through debt (bonds or employee loans) or 
equity (ordinary shares, non-voting shares, stock options, warrants, convertible 
bonds). 
Employee ownership schemes can be classified as either voluntary or not. Voluntary 
ownership plans, when they are accessible to the whole workforce, have the 
advantage of giving employees equal opportunities to buy shares or stock options, 
without compelling anyone to do so. The workers who eventually decide to step into 
voluntary schemes make a personal investment and can therefore be considered to be 
really interested by their participation in the capital of their company. This is not the 
case when schemes are not voluntary. In this second case shares are distributed for 
free to all the members of the organisation. Belgium has for instance an approved 
voluntary option scheme since 1999, but no approved non-voluntary options schemes. 
The 1999 law on options schemes requires the beneficiaries to pay an income tax on 
those options before they reach maturity. In effect, the beneficiaries thus have to pay 
for options that might not be used eventually. 
Several authors (e.g. Long, 1978) have argued that a personal initial financial 
investment is required for the full expected effects of ownership to be realised. Others 
(e.g. Rosen, 2000), noting that a chain is only as strong as its weakest part, have relied 
on that analogy to claim that all employees of a corporation should be actually 
involved in employee ownership plans for the corporation to reap the full benefits of 
employee ownership. 
2 In the case of employee share-ownership, the employees share in the losses of the corporation in the 
sense that the value of their shares can drop sharply. One could argue that the value of the bonus (the 
shares) can drop to zero, but never be negative. This will be the case as long as financial participation 
does not undermine the base wage level; this condition is most often met (see Van Den Bulcke, 1999; 
Rosen, 2000). Moreover, most firms will set up fmancial participation schemes only when there is a 
profit to share with the employees. Hence, the possibility to share in the losses is in most cases a mere 
theoretical possibility. 
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Long provides an argument for voluntary schemes, while Rosen favours non-
voluntary schemes3 (indeed, he advocates the American ESOPs, where stock is owned 
collectively). Both claims are not incompatible: Long and Rosen would probably 
agree that the ideal situation is one in which all employees voluntarily enter an 
ownership scheme. In practice, however, this ideal situation is a very unlikely one, 
and when the management of a corporation wants to set up a plan, a choice must be 
made between a voluntary/individual and a non-voluntary/collective ownership plan. 
The choice must eventually be guided by the belief in the respective merits of these 
policy options. 
In this paper we defend the claim that non-voluntary/collective plans should be 
preferred over voluntary/individual plans. Our arguments include an analysis of 
several predicted effects of employee ownership, and an empirical test of that analysis 
through two case-studies in small software companies. The core of the argument is, 
on the one hand, that socio-dynamic effects of ownership outweigh other effects of 
ownership (cognitive effects and extrinsic motivation), and on the other hand, that 
voluntary/individual plans communicate ethical values and result in partitions that 
weaken the positive socio-dynamic effects of ownership. The fIrst point will be dealt 
with in §§ 2 and 3; the latter will be dealt with in § 5. § 4 is devoted to a summary of 
the methodology and results of the case-studies. 
2. Financial participation: three models of its effects 
Financial participation (hence ownership) may potentially affect many dimensions of 
an organisation. The largest body of literature, though, focuses on the impact of 
financial participation upon productivity, profItability, employee satisfaction and 
employment (Kruse & Blasi, 1995; Winther, 1995). In this paper, we will deal mainly 
with the effects of ownership upon satisfaction and profItability. Various models 
compete to explain these effects. 
First of all, financial participation is claimed to have individual motivational effects: 
enhanced individual autonomy, link between individual and collective performance, 
goal acceptance, self-effIcacy, decreased resistance to change, identifIcation with the 
company, goal congruence, feelings of membership, satisfaction of individual ego, 
acquisition of new skills, heightened sense of responsibility, and so on. 
Individual effects are explained by extrinsic and intrinsic motivation models. The 
extrinsic motivation model focuses on the positive impact of financial participation on 
employees' wealth. According to this model, fInancial participation will increase 
employees' satisfaction and commitment only when it generates substantial fInancial 
benefIts (Klein, 1987; French, 1987). The increased satisfaction results from the 
higher income, while the increased commitment is a consequence of the capacity of 
financial participation to bring the employee's fInancial interests in line with 
managers' and shareholders', which leads the employees to act so as to maximise the 
financial performance of their fIrm. 
3 It is worth emphasising that "non-voluntary" does not imply that the scheme has been set up without 
the consent of a majority of employees. 
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The intrinsic motivation model focuses on the individual identification with the 
corporation (Klein, 1987; Pendleton et al., 1998). Financial participation is argued to 
foster ipso facto feelings of identification and harmony, because it nurtures a sense of 
familiarity with the corporation, particularly when fmancial participation involves 
employee ownership of the firm. This identification increases workers' feelings of 
integration (Argyris, 1964), membership and goal congruence (Long, 1978). 
In addition to these merely individual effects, participation is said to induce socio-
dynamic effects: enhanced information flows leading to better decisions, cooperation 
within the firm, group discipline and peer monitoring. Throughout this text, these 
effects will be referred to alternatively as socio-dynamic, collective or simply group 
effects of participation. The positive individual attitudes towards the firm listed in the 
previous paragraph Gob satisfaction, membership, commitment, ... ) are assumed to 
increase individual motivation, understood as the desire to perform (Long, 1978). This 
desire will lead the individual not only to perform better herself, but also to monitor 
and facilitate her peers' performance, especially when the link between individual 
performance and organisational performance is tenuous (Fitzroy & Kraft, 1987). Such 
peer monitoring may be even more effective than hierarchical control (Bernstein, 
1979). 
Individual and group effects, e.g. identification, membership feelings and peer 
monitoring, may occur if only part of the workforce actually participates fmancially. 
However, motivational effects (with the exception of the satisfaction of ego needs) 
will be stronger when the formal and informal environments are congruent (Argyris, 
1957), i.e. when co-workers share similar values (Locke et al., 1986). The more 
employees share similar values, the better. Therefore, to the extent that participation 
signals particular values, these motivational effects (again, with the exception of the 
satisfaction of ego needs) will be stronger not only when everyone is eligible to the 
financial participation schemes, but more so when everyone is actually involved with 
it - when financial participation extends to all members of the organisation (or to all 
members of a division in a multi-divisional firm). 
A third category of effects is indirect. Proponents of the indirect model suggest that 
financial participation can have a lasting impact on employee attitudes only when it 
leads to greater participation in decision-making4 (Long, 1978; Tannenbaum, 1983; 
Buchko, 1992; Florkowski & Schuster, 1992). There exists strong empirical support 
for this model (Buchko, 1992; Keef 1998; Long, 1978; Klein, 1987; Rosen & 
Quarrey, 1987; Pepper 2; Poole & Jenkins, 1990, Hammer et al., 1982). Participation 
in decision-making in turn triggers a series of both individual and collective effects. 5 
4 Participation in decision-making is abbreviated in this text as PDM. We may distinguish between 
participation in operational decisions (operational PDM), participation in decisions about personnel 
issues (personnel PDM) and participation about strategic decisions (strategic PDM). 
5 Throughout this text, "participation" refers to both "fmancial participation" and "participation in 
decision-making". Because of our focus on employee ownership, as opposed to profit sharing, 
"ownership" will be used alternatively with "financial participation". 
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On the level of the organisation, socio-dynamic effects of ownership (and 
participation in decision-making) are much more important than individual effects. In 
anything but very small organisations, individual workers, especially on the work 
floor level, are quite unlikely to have any significant impact upon organisational 
performance. The aggregated impact of each worker's individual motivation may 
make a difference, but the different jobs, hence the workers' levels of motivation are 
increasingly interdependent, especially in service corporations operating in dynamic 
sectors. Consequently, effective collective functioning entails more than the sum of 
effective individual work efforts. This means that a group's ability to organise smooth 
cooperation between its members will mediate in important ways the aggregated 
impact of participation. Considering that a key socio-dynamic effect of ownership is 
precisely to foster horizontal cooperation, it is fair to say that, except maybe at the top 
of the organisation, the socio-dynamic effects of participation are likely to be 
prevalent. 
Horizontal and vertical cooperation among and between employees and managers 
may be one of the most important aspects of organisational socio-dynamics from the 
point of view of the organisation itself. Cooperation is an all-encompassing catch-
word, which may include respect of the hierarchy and formal procedures, industrial 
relations, open communication, the collectivistic orientation, or simply a good 
atmosphere among colleagues (Cludts, 2000). In that sense, cooperation is a vague 
concept and it is trivial to say that cooperation is important in organisations. However, 
cooperation may also be understood as a mindset: the willingness to forego immediate 
personal advantage in order to facilitate joint decisions and actions (Sugden 1987, 
1993). Recent developments of agency theory and contract theory have shown how 
much corporations can be damaged when their members do not apply these basic 
principles of cooperation. 
The level of cooperation within a firm depends on many other factors than ownership 
and participation. Therefore, if the primary impact of ownership is socio-dynamic, we 
need to study the other organisational factors that influence the socio-dynamics of the 
firm in order to assess the impact of ownership upon organisational performance. In 
this text, we want to emphasise the role of social capital. 
3. Organisational social capital and socio-dynamic effects of ownership 
Loury (1977) was one of the first authors to introduce the term "social capital". He 
used that term to name the resources that are available to an individual through her 
personal network of relationships. From his interest in child development, Loury had 
primarily family relationships and primary communities in mind (schools, etc.). His 
work lied in the same line as Granovetter's (1973). Granovetter emphasised the 
importance of personal relationship networks for the career prospects of individuals. 
He argued that personal relationships give access to information that can provide a 
"competitive" advantage to its owner in the race for promotion. Later Bourdieu 
(1992) referred to social capital as ''the sum of the resources ( ... ) that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu, 
1992: 119). 
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Those three authors conceptualise social capital as an individual resource (a "private 
good") that yields private benefits to its possessor. The concept of social capital has 
however become a widespread concept only since the publication of Putnam's (1993) 
study of the regional economic development in Italy. Putnam defines social capital as 
"features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve 
the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (Putnam, 1993: 167). 
Putnam's view on social capital differs in at least one important respect from Loury's 
and Bourdieu's. According to Putnam, the primary benefits of social capital accrue to 
the community rather than to the individual. The community can be a region, as in his 
original study, a country (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995) or a corporation (Baker, 
1990). Putnam conceptualises social capital as a "public good". When the 
organisation is taken as the unit and focus of analysis, these "public good" aspects of 
social capital are more important than the "private good" aspects. The relevant 
questions are whether organisational social capital can enhance organisational 
performance on the one hand, and what organisational practices can foster the 
development of organisational social capital on the other hand. 
Following up on the organisational literature (Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Burt, 1995), we suggest the following definition of organisational 
social capital: the resources, embedded in personal relationships, which facilitate 
successful collective action within the organisation. Those resources include a culture 
of communication, shared norms of trust and reciprocity, commitment to the common 
organisational goals and shared value systems. We distinguish two dimensions of 
organisational social capital: on the one hand the relational dimension, which refers to 
social interaction, face-to-face contact and the quality of interpersonal 
communication; on the other hand the attitudinal dimension, including such things as 
shared trust, norms and values. A third dimension, namely a cognitive dimension, is 
sometimes distinguished (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). We do not investigate that 
dimension of social capital in this text because it partly coincides with the extrinsic 
effects of employee ownership. 
The question to be dealt with here is the role of organisational social capital as a 
moderator of the effects of ownership. We will briefly come back to the (reverse) 
effect of ownership upon organisational social capital in the fourth section of this 
paper. For the time being, we summarise the two main reasons why organisational 
social capital is relevant to a full-fledged study of participation.6 
6 Throughout the rest of this text, "organisational social capital" will be abbreviated alternatively as 
"social capital" and as "ose". 
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3.1. Organisational social capital as shared values 
Ownership is often (see e.g. Poole & Jenkins, 1990: 22) assumed to generate ipso 
facto "intrinsic" commitment. It is typical of the largest part of research on 
participation that the mechanisms by which participation generates "intrinsic" 
commitment have not been studied carefully.7 Though some of those mechanisms 
may be self-evident (e.g. psychologists have known for a long time that power is 
intrinsically rewarding), others may suffer from a lack of attention. What does it 
really mean to say that "participation makes employees feel part of an organisation", 
or that "participation increases the sense of respect between management and 
workforce"? We suggest that one of the mechanisms generating "intrinsic" 
commitment through participation is the existence of shared values between 
employees and managers. 
Poole & Jenkins (1990) have already devoted some attention to the role of values in 
the context of ownership. They have stressed "the importance of management's 
philosophical commitment to share ownership in significantly enhancing the effects of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes with regard to employee involvement 
and commitment to the company. Moreover," they continue, "the effectiveness of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes may have more to do with managerial 
philosophy and style than with the level of share ownership." (Poole & Jenkins, 1990: 
15, emphasis added) They add that "the considerable importance attached to 'high 
trust' between management and the workforce is particularly noteworthy" in those 
companies with profit-sharing (Poole & Jenkins, 1990: 64). Indeed, profit-sharing 
signals the existence of a shared philosophical commitment that is conducive to trust 
and cooperation. We submit that the concept of social capital is useful to 
conceptualise and contextualise the idea of shared values in relation with other 
elements of work life. 
3.2. Organisational social capital as lubricant of coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms 
There is yet another reason to believe that social capital can help us to better 
understand the effects of ownership. It is fairly straightforward to say that profit-
sharing and ownership make employees more "profit-conscious". But how does that 
consciousness translate into higher productivity? Not immediately through motivation 
and commitment, but rather through better functioning in the organisation (which is of 
course supported by motivation and commitment). What does a good functioning in 
the organisation entail? Primarily, since this is the core of any organisation, good 
coordination and good cooperation. But to acknowledge that these are essential 
drivers of organisational success is not enough to realise these. An additional 
ingredient of efficient organisational functioning is the ability to cooperate - and this 
is the field in which social capital can make a contribution. 
This allows us to formulate research propositions in the next two paragraphs. 
7 We put "intrinsic" between quotation marks because we suspect the word "intrinsic" to be used to 
mask the ignorance of what happens in the "black box" mind of employees. 
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3.3. Ownership and the relational dimension of organisational social capital 
The relational dimension of social capital includes social interaction, face-to-face 
contact and the quality of interpersonal communication within the firm. Obviously, 
interpersonal contact and communication are essential for information exchange, joint 
decision-making, peer monitoring, and many other activities that have been proposed 
as essential mechanisms whereby ownership contributes to organisational 
performance. Though participation may foster the development of intense 
communication within the firm, we may expect that the effects of ownership will also 
depend on the communication culture and patterns which are already present when 
participation is introduced. Since such things as a firm's communication culture and 
pattern do not change overnight, we may even expect these factors to have a lasting 
effect on the impact of ownership. Hence we can develop our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: The relational dimension of organisational social capital, 
conceptualised as social interaction, face-to-face contact and the quality of 
interpersonal communication within the firm, moderates the effect of 
employee ownership upon organisational performance. 
We will not expand further on communication, for its role and importance have 
already attracted much attention (Long, 1978). Instead, we turn now to the attitudinal 
dimension of social capital. 
3.4. Ownership and the attitudinal dimension of organisational social capital 
Trust, collectivism, goal congruence, cooperation and shared values have been argued 
above to be important success factors of participation. These are essentially values, 
and correspond to the attitudinal dimension of social capital. Employee ownership and 
profit-sharing may signal particular managerial values and thus reinforce employee 
commitment (see above: Poole & Jenkins, 1990) but a broader ethical commitment 
can reinforce those effects of financial participation upon trust and cooperation. 
Perotin & Robinson (2000) e.g. have been able to demonstrate the significantly 
positive interaction effect existing between participation on the one hand and equal 
opportunities policies on the other hand. Building on their insight, we want to explore 
the importance not only of managers' values, but also of the values shared between 
management and employees. The communication of managers' philosophical 
commitment and their perception by the employees may also influence the 
development of social capital. 
The relevance of philosophical commitment and shared values is not anectodical. 
Quite the contrary, they are key elements of corporate culture (Key, 1999) and 
necessary building blocks of trust, cooperation, personal identification with the 
corporation, commitment and personal development, which are essential determinants 
of organisational performance (Argyris, 1957; Collier & Esteban, 2000; Flores & 
Solomon, 1998), also in participative organisations. Hence we can develop our second 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: The attitudinal dimension of organisational social capital, 
conceptualised as shared trust, norms and values, moderates the effect of 
employee ownership upon organisational performance. 
8 
Figure 1 summarises these two propositions graphically: 
Ownership Performance 
OSC 
-relational 
-attitudinal 
Figure 1: The moderating role of osc. 
Obviously, these two propositions do not aim to overthrow extant theories: the 
motivational effects of PDM e.g. have been ascertained by generations of 
psychologists and organisation scholars, and OSC does not provide any concept of 
motivation that would be more accurate than existing concepts. An OSC-based theory 
of participation should rather be complementary. Just as the motivational and socio-
dynamic theories of PDM provide complementary insights, we expect that OSC 
would add up yet another insight in the mechanisms underlying employee ownership. 
That additional insight focuses on attitudes and values, in particular attitudes towards 
cooperation and values fostering collective action. This would add up to the growing 
but heretofore separate streams of literature which present participation and ethics as 
strategic management variables (e.g. Lawler, 1986; Pruzan & Thyssen, 1990). 
3.5. Interdependence between the different components of OSC 
OSC is not a monolithical concept: its different elements have different antecedents, 
may stabilise at differing levels and influence one another in a dynamic fashion. Tsai 
& Ghoshal (1998) have empirically explored the interdependence between different 
components of social capital in the context of a multi-unit corporation. As they 
expected, they found significant relationships between the constructs of trust, social 
interaction and shared values. 
We are very aware that strong correlations are also expected between the different 
scales we have used to conduct our case studies. We also expect social capital to have 
a direct impact upon organisational performance: though OSC mediates the effects of 
participation, we firmly believe that OSC is an important resource in most 
corporations, including non-participative ones. We finally expect organisational 
performance to have a definite impact upon the level ofOSC: the fact that cooperation 
and shared values are more likely to be found in healthy organisations than ill 
corporations on the brink of bankruptcy, does not need lengthy explanations. 
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These considerations lead us to formulate two additional propositions: 
Proposition 3: The relational and attitudinal dimensions of organisational 
social capital, though distinct, mutually influence each other. 
Proposition 4: Organisational social capital is a direct determinant of 
organisational performance (satisfaction and profitability). In turn, 
organisational performance feeds back to organisational social capital. 
These last two propositions will not as such be verified empirically in our case-
studies. However, they are mentioned here in order to make explicit the complexity of 
the research object. That complexity will lead us to contextualise our findings. In 
order to sketch a full model, we also include managerial philosophical commitment 
into the picture. We clearly do not wish to study such an intangible concept, and this 
is the reason why the arrows linking managerial philosophical commitment with other 
concepts in figure 2 are dashed. It is nevertheless important to place it in the picture, 
since this commitment has been claimed to moderate the effects of participation in 
important ways (Poole & Jenkins, 1990). In our scheme, the impact of managerial 
philosophical commitment goes through the organisation's social capital. Eventually, 
we recognise that since formal ownership may reflect a particular managerial 
philosophical commitment, it may also have a direct impact upon social capital. 
Ownership Perfonnance 
t 
! 
I 
! 
Managerial 
_ .... _ .... -. OSC 
Phil. Comt. -relational 
-attitudinal 
Figure 2. Relationships between Organisational Social Capital and organisational 
petformance. 
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4. Method and key facts of the case-studies in two small software corporations 
We tested the validity of our first two propositions through case-studies. The primary 
reason to choose the case-study method was the explorative nature of our research. 
Though we have been able to formulate some propositions based on theory, the lack 
of empirical research in this field warrants such qualitative research in order to better 
understand the mechanisms at play, and to uncover related hypotheses that could be 
tested quantitatively at a later stage. Several additional reasons supported this 
methodological choice. First, no study has attempted, to our knowledge, to measure 
OSC on the grounds of data gathered from individual organisation members. This 
means that our measure instruments were tentative, and case-studies offer good 
possibilities to assess the validity of measure instruments, by comparing quantitative 
data with interview data. Secondly, many relevant organisational and individual 
characteristics are not pictured in our simple model, for instance the cultural 
background of the employees and the charisma of the managers. Case-studies allow 
us to take those missing elements into account in ways that are impracticable with 
merely quantitative analysis. Thirdly, the direction of causalities is very difficult to 
establish with non-longitudinal quantitative data. Since we have not been able to 
conduct longitudinal research, we have opted for the case methodology, which allows 
us to hear from the people involved their opinion about causality. Fourthly, 
participation depends to a large extent on the institutional environment: culture, 
labour legislation, fiscal legislation, development of the stock markets, etc. In order to 
keep the complexity within bounds it was decided to conduct our study within 
Belgium only. The small number of Belgian firms having set up significant 
participation schemes made it impossible to draw a sample large enough to conduct a 
large-scale quantitative survey. 
In this paper, we report the findings from two partly employee-owned small software 
corporations. Both corporations are Belgian, have the same NACE-BEL classification 
code 721 and the same sectoral industrial bargaining committee number 218. One 
corporation, CPX, is established in Flanders, while the other corporation, NSI, is 
established in Wallonia. None is publicly traded. 
CPX employs 65 people, 3 of which sit in the board of management. In addition, CPX 
has three subsidiaries (in the Netherlands, Germany and the US) totalling about 35 
employees. NSI employs 67 people, 7 of which sit in the executive board. NSI has 
recently taken over another small Walloon software company employing an additional 
20 people. Employees in both firms (self-reportedly) enjoy some decision-making 
power regarding operational Gob-related) decisions, and very little regarding strategic 
(organisation-level) decisions. Participation in decision-making in both firms is very 
similar and mostly informal: managers apply an open-doors policy which functions 
thanks to the small size of the organisation. Employees have yearly appraisal 
interviews with the management, which are also an opportunity for the employees to 
raise problematic issues and to make suggestions regarding the conduct of the 
corporation. Finally, both corporations organise regular personnel meetings in order to 
inform the employees about figures and tactical and strategic developments. During 
these meetings, employees also have the opportunity to raise questions. These 
meetings are quarterly at NSI, they were quarterly at CPX until 1999, and have been 
held monthly since then. There are no other formal Goint) committees involving 
"work floor" employees, most likely because of the small size of both corporations. 
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Project and/or team leaders are regularly consulted by the management. Formal 
decision-making power rests entirely within the hands of the top-managers, i.e. 3 
people at CPX and 1 person at NSI. NSI's turnover increased from 3.8 to 5.7 million 
euros between 1995 and 1999, with a net profit rising from 0.16 to 0.28 million euros. 
Over the same period, CPX's turnover went up from 4.6 to 6.7 million euros, and its 
net profit increased from 0.07 to 0.15 million euros. 
This short description shows that in many respects, these corporations are very 
similar. The most significant difference is their ownership schemes. 86% of the 
capital of CPX is owned by its employees, but the stakes are highly unequal: two of 
the three managers (the founders of the corporation) own together 76%, the third 
manager and four other senior employees own together 6%, and 4% of the capital has 
recently been offered for sale to the other employees through an approved option-
scheme coupled to a capital increase. The remaining 13% are held by a venture 
capitalist. In contrast, managers and employees ofNSI own "only" 51% of the shares, 
but these are more equally spread: the management owns 31 % and other employees 
jointly own 20% of the shares. The remaining 49% are held by external investors: a 
multinational computer corporation and a regional investment fund. 
Next to their different ownership schemes, the main differences between both 
corporations may reasonably be attributed to their corporate history and culture; these 
are partly reflected in their OSC. We measured organisational performance and social 
capital with a written questionnaire that was been distributed to all non-executive 
employees of both firms. 8 60 questionnaires were distributed in NSI, and 30 were 
returned (50%). 55 questionnaires were distributed in CPX, and 37 returned (67%). 
The questionnaire contained several scales. Summary information about the scales 
used can be found in Appendix 1. Those scales may be grouped as follows: 
Table 1: Scales used in the questionnaire, and their structur/ 
Vertical communication Relational OSC Horizontal communication 
Openness 
Vertical trust 
Horizontal trust 
Generalised trust Attitudinal OSC 
Ethical climates 
Collectivism 
Congruence 
Participation in DM PDM Autonomy 
Job satisfaction Performance Commitment 
8 Data about financial participation and financial performance were gathered in the corporation's 
accounts and internal documentation, and through interviews with the managers. 
9 The detailed list of questions is shown in Appendix 4, as well as the reliability scores. All but three 
reliability scores are above 0.8, the three others are still above 0.75. 
12 
The "ethical climates" scale includes four subscales measuring caring (C), 
deontological/regulative (R), instrumental (S) and independent (D) ethical climates. 
The ethical climate is not homogeneous in either of the two firms. In both firms, the 
four different ethical climates are present, though to different extents. It also appeared 
that there was a clear pattern of correlations between the different climates: 
Table 2: Ethical climates: Pearson correlations and significance levels (N=65) 
ECQR ECQD ECQS 
ECQD -0,309 1,000 
0,013, 
ECQS -0,058 -0,002 1,000 
0,650 0,987, 
ECQC 0,332 -0,060 -0,455 
0,007 0,639 0,000 
This indicates that there is a variety of ethical orientations among our respondents: 
one combines caring and deontological thinking, the other is more independent 
minded, and the third one more instrumental. A cluster analysis conducted on this 
sample allowed us to identify three clusters characterised indeed by different scores 
on those ethical climates subscales (see Appendix 2). The different climates have 
significantly different correlations with other scales, which are not discussed further 
in this paper, like fairness and external ethics. A consistent pattern emerges: 
correlations are strongly positive with caring and deontological climates, neutral with 
independent climate and strongly negative with instrumental climate subscales. This 
lead us to select the caring and deontological ethical climates scales as reliable 
indicators of the general ethical climate of a corporation and of the existence of shared 
values. The instrumental climate may be considered as another reliable indicator of 
the attitudinal dimension of OSC, when it is reverse-scored. In contrast, the 
independent ethical climate scale will not be considered in further analyses. Our 
initial model, completed with all scales and subscales used; summarises graphically 
the theoretical framework that we have used to conduct our case studies. 
Ownership 
-Ownership data 
·PDM operational 
·PDM personnel 
• PDM strategic 
-Autonomy 
OSC 
• Vertical communication 
• Horizontal communication 
-Openness 
-Horizontal trust 
·Verticaltrust 
-Generalised trust 
·Caring/deontoiogical climate 
·Collectivism 
·Congrunce 
Figure 3: Modelfor the case-studies. 
Performance 
-Financial data 
-Job satisfaction 
-Commitment 
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5. Findings from the case-studies 
5.1. Ownership in both firms 
We have already highlighted the ownership structure of both firms in § 4. Though 
external shareholders own a larger share of the stock of NSI than of CPX, the non-
managerial employees of NSI collectively own 20% while the non-managerial 
employees of CPX own only 5% of their firm. The consequence is that CPX 
managers have absolute power as shareholders and directors, while the management 
of NSI has to form a coalition with either the external shareholders or the employees 
in order to have a majority of the votes on the general assembly. In addition, the 
management of NSI has two seats out of five in the board of directors, while the 
employees have one, with the consequence that the management has to form a 
coalition on that level too. In practice, most decisions are taken after reaching a 
consensus with the different parties, but in case of disagreement the management is 
strongly committed to form a coalition with the employees in order to keep decision-
making power inside NSI. In contrast with NSI, none of the non-managerial 
employees are associated with strategic decisions at CPX, and the management is not 
committed to participative decision-making at strategic level. 
Despite that, the perceived opportunities to participate in strategic decisions are 
similar and quite low in both firms (scores of 2.433 and 2.676).10 The perceived 
opportunities to participate in operational decisions are also similar, though higher, in 
both firms (scores of 3.973 and 3.733). The autonomy scores are somewhat higher, 
and also very similar between the two firms (scores of 4.559 and 4.644). We observe 
a larger difference regarding the perceived opportunities to participate in personnel 
decisions: 4.622 at CPX vs. 2.100 at NSI. 
5.2. Organisational social capital in both firms 
All our indicators of social capital, both relational and attitudinal, are consistently 
higher at CPX than at NSI. The average difference (in favour of CPX) is 0.708 (on a 
7-points scale), with a standard deviation of 0.347 and values ranging from 0.159 
(collectivism scale) to 1.326 (vertical trust scale) (see Appendix 1). 
5.3 Performance in both firms 
As already indicated in § 4, the financial perfonnance of both firms is quite 
comparable, both in absolute and relative terms. Over the last 5 years, NSI's turnover 
increased by 57% and CPX's by 45%, though CPX's turnover in 1999 is still 16% 
higher than NSI's. This difference is to a large extent explained by the slightly 
different size of both corporations. Indeed, when we compare the value added per 
employee in each firm in 1999, we find 65.150 euros at CPX and 65.700 euros at NSI. 
The difference is negligible. 
10 Unless stated otherwise, all scores are measured on a 7-points Likert-type scale going from 1 (very 
low) to 7 (very high). 
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What about non-fmancial performance? The respective average job satisfaction scores 
at CPX and NSI are 4.865 and 4.633; the respective commitment scores are 4.532 and 
4.317. The differences between both firms do not appear to be significant. 
5.4. Empirical test of the propositions 
It is obviously impossible to "test" propositions in a statistically valid sense with two 
cases only. However, we observed that formal ownership is much stronger at NSI, in 
the sense that employees possess a much higher share of the equity, but OSC is 
markedly higher at CPX, and the performance of both firms is similar by all the 
accounts we have presented here. These findings support our first two propositions: 
stronger ownership does not lead to stronger effects when the level of social capital is 
low in the firm. 
However, these case-studies aim not only at studying the plausibility of different 
mechanisms, but also at uncovering new ones, that could be tested with further 
research. During the research, we were struck by the low level of social capital at NSI, 
despite the fact that the management was genuinely committed to the well-being of its 
employees. Moreover, NSI is the "product" of an employee buy-out conducted eight 
years ago. We expected that to lead to the emergence of strong group feelings, but we 
did not measure those. The search for a satisfactory explanation to this puzzle lead us 
to uncover the relation between the collective nature of the scheme and its impact 
upon social capital. 
Firstly, we thought that we could have badly operationalised the concept of social 
capital. Some of the indicators we have used to measure OSC were already validated 
but a number of them were developed for this study. Some of them might have low 
validity, but the remarkable convergence between all OSC indicators used in this 
study discards the thought that a poor operationalisation might have significantly 
affected our results. This convergence is additionally supported by an exploratory 
factor analysis run on the scales used to measure OSC. Our initial expectation, based 
on social capital theory, was that two distinct relational and attitudinal dimensions 
would come out of the analysis. However, contrary to that expectation, one single 
overwhelming factor emerged (see Appendix 3). This result raises new questions 
about the distinction between the different components of ose but discards doubts 
about the consistence of our measure instruments. 
Interviews with managers and employees of both corporations provided a clue to this 
puzzle. One indicator that was not included in our ose indicators was a measure 
instrument of reciprocity - for a lack of adequate measure instrument. The concept of 
fairness, which is closely related to the idea of reciprocity, proved nevertheless to be 
the key to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying ownership. 
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Though employees at NSI own collectively 20% of the shares, these shares are owned 
by approximately 60% of the employees, while the remaining 40% did not have the 
opportunity to buy any. This situation has an historical explanation: when NSI was 
founded as a spin-off from an existing (larger) company, its employees were required 
to invest some money in NSI. As NSI grew, it needed to recruit new employees, but 
not to increase its capital, with the consequence that no shares were offered to those 
new employees. This results in the present inequality between "ancient" and "new" 
employees. In contrast, at CPX, the management owns an overwhelming majority of 
shares, and non-managerial employees have the chance to buy only a fraction of the 
capital, but all employees have access to those shares, to an extent which is 
proportionate to their functional level. 
An analysis of the questionnaires gathered confIrms this intuition. At CPX, the lower 
satisfaction level of a relatively large group of employees is explained mainly by their 
rejection of the regulative climate, paperwork and lengthy procedures. Their rating of 
ethics and fairness, though slightly lower, does not differ signifIcantly from the 
ratings of the more satisfIed employees. At NSI, in contrast, we see that the less 
satisfIed employees do not differ from the more satisfIed in their appraisal of the 
regulative climate, but rate ethics and fairness much lower, and point at self-interested 
behaviour among their colleagues as being problematic. What's more, this group of 
less satisfied employees is larger at NSI than at CPX (40% at the former, compared 
with 30% at the latter), and gathers at NSI a majority of younger employees who have 
no or just a few shares, while the more satisfied tend to be older employees who own 
several shares. We have also observed that the more satisfIed employees of NSI are 
more satisfied and more positive about their fIrm than their counterparts at CPX. They 
also indicate a higher level of OSC. On the contrary, the less satisfIed employees of 
NSI are less positive over their fIrm than their counterparts at CPX, and indicate 
lower levels of OSC. To put it bluntly: the gap between more and less satisfIed 
employees is larger at NSI. 
The benefIcial influence of OSC on one half of the workforce of NSI (the more 
satisfIed) may counterbalance the negative influence of low levels of OSC of the other 
half of its employees (the less satisfIed). The net effect of those opposed trends could 
explain why the performances of NSI and CPX are comparable, despite the 
dramatically lower level of OSC at NSI. Indeed, the more motivated and satisfied part 
of the workforce at NSI is the "oldest", hence the most powerful in the organisation, 
through classical mechanisms of tenure-related promotions. Nevertheless, this 
situation is likely to change in the medium term, as the company continues to grow 
and to recruit new employees 
It is interesting to note that though the high level of inequality between employees and 
managers at CPX does not seem to be a problem, the objectively smaller degree of 
inequality between managers and employees at NSI is. Though our case-studies do 
not allow us to test strictly the claim that voluntary/individual plans communicate 
ethical values and result in partitions that weaken the positive socio-dynamic effects 
of ownership, we found that the nature of the plan indeed signals a particular 
managerial commitment to either spread ownership broadly or not. It is absolutely 
clear that this signal has a defInite impact upon OSC and socio-dynamics in the firm. 
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Our main conclusion is that though the management's philosophical commitment may 
have a direct impact upon OSC, we have found in these cases that formal ownership 
arrangements are interpreted as signalling managerial commitment to participation, 
and that those signals are much more important than other informal expressions of 
that commitment, such as informal participation in decision-making. This calls for 
careful consideration of formal structures as a determinant of expectations and 
attitudes, regardless of the leadership style which is adopted by the management. 
A second finding is that, though the ethical climate depends (in these small 
organisations) to a large extent upon the attitudes of the management, the respondents 
were perfectly able to make a distinction between the quality of vertical and 
horizontal relationships. When "horizontal" and "vertical" variables are separated, we 
observe that the average scores of the "horizontal" factor differ much less (across both 
firms) than the average scores of the "vertical" variables. This gap between horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of OSC can be interpreted as signalling particular 
expectations with regard to participation. There is indeed an argument saying that the 
more people experience participation, the more they wish to participate (Pateman, 
1970). Our findings lend support to that argument: employees of CPX have never 
been offered decision-making power on strategic level, and do not expect to have any. 
They feel that managers are competent, and trust them. In contrast, the employees of 
NSI know that they hold collectively an important share of the capital, and they are 
often consulted by the management before taking important decisions. Nevertheless, 
they do not experience many formal opportunities to participate in decision-making at 
strategic level, hence their frustration towards the management which is thought to 
monopolise power, even if it is not less competent than CPX's management. This 
calls for further theoretical refinement of the social capital concept. The need for such 
theoretical refinement is emphasised by the fact that we were not able to observe two 
components of OSC distinguished by theory, in casu an attitudinal and a relational 
component. Our study suggests in particular that horizontal and vertical dimensions of 
OSC could be defined and measured separately. 
A third lesson to be drawn is that OSC may very well moderate the impact of 
ownership, but that the indicators used to measure OSC should definitely include 
some measure of reciprocity or justice. 
A last lesson concerns the "homogeneity" of the workforce. We initially hoped to 
capture that homogeneity by comparing homogeneous ethical climates in different 
organisations, but that attempt proved unsuccessful. Our findings show nonetheless 
that an adequate measure of homogeneity would provide very important information 
about OSC in a particular firm; there is a need of adequate measure instruments. 
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6. Conclusion 
Our initial claim is that voluntary/individual ownership plans communicate ethical 
values and result in partitions that weaken the positive socio-dynamic effects of 
ownership. Our case-studies do not allow us to test rigorously that claim. At NSI, the 
scheme was not really voluntary, yet only half of the workforce is currently involved. 
At CPX, the scheme is voluntary and most employees, though not all of them, decided 
to step in. It is nonetheless very clear that the nature of the plan signals a particular 
managerial commitment to spread ownership broadly or not. This signal has a definite 
impact upon OSC and socio-dynamics in the firm. Though the managerial 
philosophical commitment may have a direct impact upon OSC, we have found in 
these cases that formal ownership arrangements are interpreted as signalling 
managerial commitment, and that those signals are more important than other 
informal expressions of that commitment. Though two cases cannot provide 
compelling evidence of general mechanisms, these case-studies have brought insight 
into an as yet undocumented signalling mechanism, which could be tested more 
extensively with further research. 
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SCALES 
NSI CPX 
Mean SEMean Mean SEMean 
Vertical communication K'co 3,650 0,312 4,748 0,238 
Horizontal communication IHCO 5,345 0,307 5,784 0,194 
Openness PAR 4,267 0,268 4,928 0,190 
Vertical trust IvTR 3,467 0,309 4,793 0,212 
Horizontal trust IHTR 4,317 0,225 4,809 0,217 
Generalised trust GTR 5,000 0,249 5,811 0,189 
Deontological climate ~CQR 2,747 0,231 3,704 0,210 
Instrumental climate ~CQS 4,214 0,236 3,361 0,201 
Caring climate ECQC 2,922 0,251 3,583 0,162 
Independent climate ECQD 4.274 0.262 3.861 0.235 
Collectivism COLL 5,625 0,183 5,784 0,139 
Congruence CON 3,900 0,300 4,378 0,197 
PDM - operational PDMI 3,733 0,352 3,973 0,289 
PDM - welfare PDM2 2,100 0,277 4,622 0,286 
PDM - strategic PDM3 2,433 0,317 2,676 0,288 
Autonomy AUT 4,644 0,320 4,559 0,222 
Satisfaction SAT 4,633 0,258 4,865 0,186 
Affective commitment CMTA 4,317 0,296 4,532 0,239 
Moral commitment CMTM 2,922 0,324 2,468 0,213 
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APPENDIX 2: CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
Final Cluster Centres 
Cluste 
2 3 
ECQC 3,93 3,38 2,16 
EC()S 313 371 469 
ECQD 444 3,61 4,08 
EC(lR 2,73 456 2,21 
SAT 5,56 4,79 342 
ANOVA 
Cluster Erro F Sig. 
Mean df Me31l df 
Square Square 
EC()C 15,490 2 971 62 15960 ,000 
EC()S 11,732 2 1,328 61 8,833 ,000 
ECQD 4,185 2 1,111 61 3769 ,029 
EC()R 32,448 2 ,783 62 41424 ,000 
SAT 22,851 2 ,924 64 24727 ,000 
Note: The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters 
have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. The 
observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be interpreted 
as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal. 
Number of Cases in each Cluster 
Cluster 1 26 
2 25 
3 16 
IValid 67 
Missing 
° 
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APPENDIX 3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OSC SCALES 
Scree Plot 
Component Number 
Component Matrix 
Unrotated Rotated 
Componen Componen 
s s 
1 2 1 2 
EO R ,434 - 645 ,550 - 550 
EO S -,638 ,017 -,630 - 105 
EC C ,705 -,156 ,722 -,018 
EO D ,067 630 -,055 631 
CON ,608 -,174 _,630 - 055 
COLL 339 ,503 ,236 558 
VTR ,847 -,158 ,862 -,007 
HTR ,606 ,076 ,580 ,191 
GTR ,615 ,356 ,535 468 
PAR 842 033 820 195 
IVCO ,831 ,027 821 ,133 
HCO 553 ,286 ,488 387 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
Note: These are the results of a factor analysis that was conducted on a larger 
population (N=288) in order to enhance its significance; the results of the same factor 
analysis conducted in the two firms considered in this paper were very similar. 
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APPENDIX 4: COMPOSITION OF THE SCALES 
We have relied whenever possible on existing scales with known reliabilities. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all scales are Likert-scales with 7 answer possibilities ranging 
from "strongly disagree" through "neutral" to "strongly agree". Reliabilities have 
been assessed with Cronbach's standardised item alpha (a.). The reliabilities were 
computed using a sample of288 respondents. Items marked (R) are reverse-scored. 
The scales appear hereunder in the same order as in Appendix 1. 
Communication 
The length of the scales was an important issue of concern, as our eventual 
questionnaire included about 130 items printed on 6 pages. This concern lead us for 
instance to reject longer communication scales (see e.g. Mohr & Spekman, 1994 and 
Whitener et al., 1998. We have included a short scale adapted from Ruppel & 
Harrington (2000). This scale contains one item for horizontal communication and 
three items for vertical communication. 
Horizontal communication 
I 
1. Employees in this firm communicate easily and freely with each other. 
Vertical communication 
1. Employees in this firm communicate easily and freely with managers. 
2. Managers in this firm communicate easily and freely with employees. 
3. There exists a culture of open communication in this firm. 
The reliability for this scale is 0.8959. 
Openness (participative climate) 
We have grouped ten items drawn from various sources under one heading in order to 
make a general assessment of the participative climate. Factor analysis indicated that 
the main factor included only the five following items. 
1. Differing opinions may be expressed and discussed openly. 
2. Problems and concerns may be voiced and discussed openly. 
3. This company is open to new ideas for improvement. 
4. Suggestions made by employees are taken into account. 
5. My company encourages me to express ideas, opinions and suggestions. 
Reliability analysis confirmed that the scale composed of those 5-items has a very 
satisfactory reliability level: 0.909. 
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Our measure instruments were adapted from Mohr & Spekman (1994) and from Tsai 
& Goshal (1998). Therefore, previous reliability estimates were not available. 
However, they proved to be very satisfactory. 
Vertical trust (trust in top managers) 
1. I trust that the top managers' decisions will be beneficial to us as employees. 
2. I feel that we do not get a fair deal from these top managers (R). 
3. Our relationship with top managers is marked by a high degree of harmony. 
4. I can rely on top managers that they will not take advantage of us even if the 
opportunity arises. 
Cronbach's alpha for this particular scale is 0.8737. 
Horizontal trust (trust in colleagues) 
This scale is mutatis mutandis an exact replication of the previous scale. Its reliability 
is very comparable: 0.8805. 
1. I trust that the my colleagues' decisions will be beneficial to me. 
2. I feel that I do not get a fair deal from my colleagues (R). 
3. My relationship with my colleagues is marked by a high degree of harmony. 
4. I can rely on my colleagues that they will not take advantage of me even if the 
opportunity arises. 
Generalised trust 
We have included one question about generalised trust, because it has been a key 
feature of the sociological social capital construct. The use of a single question about 
generalised trust is accepted practice because the operationalisation of that concept 
has not yet been settled (Stolle, 1999). The item was the following: 
1. Most people who work in this company can be trusted. 
Ethical climates 
Victor & Cullen (1988) have drawn a two-dimensional theoretical typology of ethical 
climates based on the locus of analysis (individual, local, cosmopolitan) and the 
ethical criterion (egoism, benevolence, principle). They designed a 36-items "ethical 
climate questionnaire" in order to test empirically which of the nine resulting climates 
would prevail in organisations. In practice, five factors (instead of nine climates) 
came out of their data: climates based on care, law and code, rules, instrumentality, 
and independence. Their study was replicated in another context by Wimbush et al. 
(1997), who also found five factors, though slightly different: climates based on care, 
law and rules, service, independence, and instrumentality. 
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Bouckaert & Vandenhove (1996) have made a large-scale survey in Belgium wherein 
they made the distinction between four organisational climates: participative, 
regulative, instrumental, and innovative. The last three are respectively similar to the 
"law and rules", "instrumental" and "independent" climates described by Victor & 
Cullen (1988) and Wimbush et al. (1997). 
We have drawn upon items used by Bouckaert & Vandenhove (1996) and items 
developed and tested by Victor & Cullen (1988) and tested again by Wimbush et al. 
(1997) to develop five scales comprising three-items each. 
1. Regulative/deontological ethical climate (rules and codes); 
2. Participative ethical climate; 
3. Innovative/independent ethical climate; 
4. Instrumental ethical climate; 
5. Caring ethical climate. 
However, factor analysis conducted on our data uncovered only four factors and 
revealed very high commonalities between the "participative" and the "caring" 
climate (the former emphasised care for the common good, while the latter 
emphasised care for the individual). Hence we merged those two scales, ending up 
with a four-items "caring climate" scale. The details of the four scales are shown 
below: 
Regulative/deontological ethical climate (laws, rules and codes) (0.=0.8437) 
1. It is very important to follow the company's rules and procedures here. 
2. Successful people in this company go by the book. 
3. People in this company strictly obey the company policies. 
Caring ethical climate (a=0.8518) 
1. The most important concem is the good of all the people in the company as a 
whole. 
2. In this company, people look out for each other's good. 
3. What is best for each individual is the major consideration in the company. 
4. Our major concern is always what is best for the other person. 
Innovative/independent ethical climate (0.=0.8095) 
1. In this company, people are expected to follow their own personal and moral 
beliefs. 
2. Each person in this firm decides for themselves what is right and what is wrong. 
3. In this company, people are guided by their own personal ethics. 
Instrumental ethical climate (0.=0.7841) 
1. In this company, people protect their own interests above all else. 
2. There is no room for one's personal morals or ethics in this company. 
3. People are expected to do anything to further the company's interests, regardless 
of the consequences. 
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Collectivism (collective goal orientation) 
Common measures of collectivism have been shown to include multiple dimensions: 
personal independence, importance accorded to competitive success, value attached to 
working alone, subordination of personal needs to group interests and beliefs about 
the effects of personal effort on group productivity (Wagner, 1995). Only one of those 
dimensions is of interest to us, namely the espousal of norms about the subordination 
of personal needs to group interests, which we call collective goal orientation. We 
have used as a measure of collective goal orientation the four items grouped by 
Wagner (1995) under the heading "subordination of personal needs to group 
interests". The four items are: 
1. People should be made aware that if they are going to be part of a group then they 
are sometimes going to have to do things they don't want to do 
2. People who belong to a group should realise that they're not always going to get 
what they personally want 
3. People in a group should realise that they sometimes are going to have to make 
sacrifices for the sake of the group as a whole 
4. People in a group should be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of the group's 
well-being 
Wagner does not provide reliability estimates. Our sample reliability estimate for this 
scale is 0.8869. 
Goal congruence 
Three questions were taken from Witt (1992) concerning the convergence of 
individual and organisational goals (a:O. 71). 
1. When the company achieve its goals, I am better able to achieve mine. 
2. Achieving the company's goals provides satisfaction of individual worker needs. 
3. Many workers are not sure how their work fits with the factory's goals. (R) 
In our sample, this three-items scale had a reliability of 0.6234. However, by dropping 
the last item and keeping only the first two items, the reliability increased to 0.8275. 
In our subsequent analyses, we only considered this two-items scale. 
Participation in decision-making (PDM) 
We have included three items in this questionnaire, one concerning PDM at each level 
(operational, social, strategic). 
1. I have opportunities to participate in operational decisions. 
2. I have opportunities to participate in welfare decisions. 
3. I have opportunities to participate in strategic decisions. 
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Autonomy 
This scale comes from Griffin et al. (l980) and includes four items: 
1. I have a lot of freedom to do pretty much what I want in my work. 
2. I have a lot of control over the pace of my work. 
3. I have a lot of opportunity for independent thought and action. 
4. I have a lot of overall autonomy. 
Griffin et al. mention an a of 0.79 for their scale. In our sample, the reliability was 
0.8427, which compares favourably to Griffin's figure. This reliability is comparable 
to the reliability of alternative scales with which it has a very good convergent 
validity like e.g. the scale used by Sels et al. (2000), which includes five items. 
Job satisfaction 
We have used the short job satisfaction scale introduced by Brayfield & Rothe (1951). 
Its original a is 0.75. In our sample, the reliability was 0.7755. This scale includes 
four items. We nonetheless dropped the second question because it appeared that the 
resulting three-items scale had a higher reliability (0.7789). 
1. I feel fairly well satisfied with my job. 
2. I am often bored with my job (R). 
3. I find real enjoyment in my work. 
4. I feel that I am happier with my job than most other people. 
Commitment 
Two commitment scales have been adapted from Kumar, Hibbard & Stem (1994) 
who used those in marketing research. Hence, prior reliability estimates are not 
available. They were nevertheless preferred to Allen & Meyer's (1990, 1996) similar 
scales because these are shorter, whereas they appear to have as much informational 
content. The alpha of the first scale is very high: 0.9061. The alpha of the second 
scale is also satisfactory: 0.8582. 
Affective commitment 
1. It is pleasant working for my company; that's why I continue to work here. 
2. Even if! could, I wouldn't leave this company because I like to be associated with 
this company. 
3. I want to stay employed in this company because I genuinely enjoy my 
relationship with this company. 
Moral commitment 
1. Even if I could earn more money elsewhere, I would feel guilty to leave this 
company. 
2. I feel a sense of duty to continue working for this company. 
3. Even if it were to my advantage, I feel it would be dishonourable to leave this 
company. 
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